We reject ALPRs in every form:

1. ALPRs Violate the Right to Privacy

ALPRs track and store the movements of every vehicle they scan—without a warrant, without suspicion, and without consent. This is mass surveillance, not targeted policing.

• The ALCU has released documents showing that location records being kept on tens of millions of innocent Americans in 38 states and Washington, DC. The ACLU won a lawsuit in the Supreme Court of California giving the puiblic access to ALPR records that the police were trying to keep secret, and in Los Angeles, they discovered that over 99% of scanned plates belonged to people not suspected of any crime.

• ALPRs collect millions of data points on innocent residents and visitors, creating detailed maps of where we live, worship, and work without a warrant or any active investigation.

2. ALPR Data Has Been Misused and Shared Without Oversight

Once data is collected, it can be stored for years and shared with hundreds of agencies—and sometimes even private companies. If ICE asks for ALPR data, will APD share it with them? Will the state force them to share the data at a later date? Can the Attorney General of TX or the USA get the data? This could put immigrant communities at serious risk. 

• Example: A 2020 investigation revealed that ICE accessed ALPR data from cities that had declared themselves sanctuary jurisdictions, undermining local policies.

• Half Moon Bay, San Francisco, Oakland and Delano in California, Michigan City, Indiana; Suffolk County, New York; Denver, Colorado; Pima County, Arizona; and more are not extending their ALPR contract due to concerns about ICE using the data to locate immigrants for deportation. Read about it.

• Data leak or data hack is impossible to prevent - the only safe data is data that is never collected. Will terrorist groups like Patriot Front, Proud Boys, the KKK be able to get their hands on the data at some point?

3. False Matches Lead to Dangerous Mistakes

ALPRs aren’t foolproof. They make errors. Estimates are around 10% of all cases. In a high-stakes policing environment, mistakes put lives at risk.

• Ex: In Aurora, Colorado, a Black family—including young children—was held at gunpoint after an ALPR flagged their car as stolen. It was a mistake, and the city was required to pay the family 1.9 million in damages. Read the Article from BBC. Read about the City of Austin’s $33 million budget shortfall.

• False matches disproportionately affect communities of color, where policing is already more aggressive. Read about it.

4. ALPRs Chills Free Speech and Civic Engagement

When people know they’re being watched, they change their behavior. That’s not safety—it’s suppression. With current attacks on free speech by the Trump administration and threats to people speaking out against their policies, the risk of innocent people being targeted through misuse of this surveillance information is too great.

• Studies have shown surveillance tools deter attendance at political protests, religious events, and community organizing.

• In this political climate, that’s dangerous. People shouldn’t have to choose between their rights and their safety.

5. ALPRs Are a Bad Investment with Little Return

If this technology actually prevented violent crime, we might be having a different conversation. But it doesn’t. 

Additionally, the audit report cites a number of serious and minor crimes that have been solved with the help of ALPRs, but we do not know if these crimes would have been solved without ALPR data. 

• In many cities, over 90% of ALPR alerts are for minor issues like expired registrations—not serious crimes.

• Meanwhile, data storage and system maintenance cost cities hundreds of thousands of dollars annually—money that could go to mental health response, community programs, or actual crime prevention.

6. Local Communities Have the Power to Say No

We don’t have to wait for the state or federal government to act. Our city has the authority—and the responsibility—to protect residents’ civil rights.

• Cities like San Francisco, Oakland, and Berkeley, California have already restricted or banned ALPR use due to civil rights concerns.

• Let’s be proactive, not reactive, in defending the rights of our neighbors.

Surveillance doesn't equal safety. It creates a culture of suspicion, not trust. Let's invest in real community-based solutions—not tools that watch everyone, all the time. Say no to ALPRs!

A few more of our concerns:

In May 2025 Denver City Council unanimously rejected a contract extension with Flock Group Inc. for automated license plate readers (ALPRs). 111 cameras installed throughout 70 intersections. Council members expressed concerns about law enforcement agencies at the state & federal level having access to a database enabling them to track the location of any Denver resident at any time. 

The FBI’s increased coordination with ICE raises the possibility of this data being used to track down immigrants and other vulnerable folks. FBI field offices throughout the country have been ordered by the Trump Administration to assign more agents to deportation operations. Additionally, while cities like Austin have not signed a 287(g) agreement with DHS requiring police officers to enforce federal immigration directives, more collaboration between ICE and local law enforcement should be anticipated. In June Governor Abbott signed SB 8 into law which deputizes Sheriffs to issue ICE administrative warrants and document inmate immigration status. With the state government undermining Austin’s commitment to protecting immigrants, our community should prepare for similar attempts by the Trump Administration.  

Peter Thiel & Thiel associated firms were heavy early investors in Flock Group Inc. Thiel describes Flock’s surveillance capabilities as a “force multiplier” for enhancing surveillance capabilities of governments & corporations. Thiel is a top Trump donor whose company Palantir is currently tasked by the Trump Administration with creating a master database on all US residents - which will include a mix of financial, medical & immigration records previously spread out across several federal agencies.  

APD Assistant Chief Sheldon “Scott” Askew admitted to City Council aides that APD officers were misusing the ALPR database. During certain stretches of the year, as much as 20% of the searches on the database did not have a corresponding case number or reason for the search assigned to them. This is especially concerning given that heightened scrutiny was applied to the department during the pilot phase of the ALPR program.  

Earlier this year a cop in Johnson County, Texas searched over 83,000 ALPR cameras using the Flock database to identify a woman who had an abortion. This nationwide search included states like Washington and Illinois where abortion is legal. The cop searched for the woman based on concerns expressed by her family. However, it is easy to imagine vague concerns either from controlling families, spouses, or romantic partners used as a pretense to surveil and restrict abortion access.